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ABSTRACT
Effective communication about medical countermeasures—including drugs, devices, 
and biologics—is often critical in emergency situations. Such communication, how-
ever, does not just happen. It must be planned and prepared for. One mechanism to 
develop communication strategies is through the use of prospective scenarios, which 
allow readers the opportunity to rehearse responses while also weighing the implica-
tions of their actions. This article describes the development of such a scenario: The 
SPARS Pandemic 2025–2028. Steps in this process included deciding on a time frame, 
identifying likely critical uncertainties, and then using this framework to construct a 
storyline covering both the response and recovery phases of a fictional emergency 
event. Lessons learned from the scenario development and how the scenario can be 
used to improve communication are also discussed.
KEYWORDS: prospective scenario, medical countermeasures, risk communication, 
public health emergency, crisis communication 
Medical countermeasures (MCM)—including drugs, devices, 
and biologics (e.g., vaccines)—often play critical roles in curtail-
ing the impacts of natural disease outbreaks as well as chemical, 
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biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incidents (Courtney 
& Sadove, 2015). It is not uncommon for members of the public, 
however, to misuse or hesitate to take recommended MCM (Liu 
et al., 2017; Quinn et al., 2008; Steelfisher et al., 2011). New and 
unfamiliar technology, an accelerated regulatory approval process, 
or discordant expert views may heighten perceived risks of MCM, 
leading to public aversion to the countermeasure and/or dimin-
ished public trust in MCM regulators or recommenders (Belongia 
et al., 2005; Carlsen & Glenton, 2016; Henrich & Holmes, 2011). 
In other cases, strong feelings of vulnerability in an emergency sit-
uation may prompt persons to demand unnecessary MCM, pro-
test their lack of access to MCM with limited availability, and/or 
use an excessive amount of prescribed MCM (Dart et al., 2015; 
Durigon & Kosatsky, 2012; Whitcomb et al., 2015). In still other 
situations, certain social groups may have limited access to MCM 
because some institutions are still in the process of learning how 
culture, race, language, and citizenship status produce barriers to 
health information sharing (Lin et al., 2014; Uscher-Pines et al., 
2011). To mitigate all of these issues and ensure proper and timely 
use of MCM, good communication is key.
From 2014 to 2016, the Center for Health Security undertook 
a research project to catalog MCM communication “dilemmas” 
(in the broad sense of a problem) in emergency situations and 
provide practical and strategic recommendations on how better 
to obtain desired population health outcomes through improved 
communication. The principal product was a casebook featuring 
recent health crises (e.g., 2014–2015 West Africa Ebola outbreak 
and 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant accident) that helped to illus-
trate the principles and conditions for effective MCM communi-
cation (Schoch-Spana et al., 2016). 
Much of the practice-oriented literature relies upon real cri-
ses to illustrate successful (or failed) approaches to risk and crisis 
communication (e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion [CDC], 2018; Ulmer et al., 2017). The project team similarly 
used past health emergencies to advance understanding of how 
communication enables appropriate public use of MCMs, because 
case studies have compelling benefits for learning: People rea-
son effectively through analogy and not just abstract principles, 
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contextualization makes broader principles meaningful and mem-
orable, and cases promote reflective thinking and reinforce users’ 
abilities to apply that knowledge in novel settings (Allchin, 2013; 
Epling et al., 2003).
Leveraging the same didactic qualities as retrospective cases 
(Varum & Melo, 2010), the project team subsequently developed 
a fictionalized prospective scenario—The SPARS Pandemic 2025–
2028—to further prepare users for MCM-related risk and crisis 
communication dilemmas on the horizon. A scenario is an “ana-
lytically coherent” and “imaginatively engaging” story about a pos-
sible future state (Bishop et al., 2007) that spurs users to envision 
and exercise their role in shaping potential outcomes (Borjeson 
et al., 2006; Mahmoud et al., 2009; Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008). 
Outlined in this paper and available in full online (Schoch-Spana 
et al., 2017), the SPARS scenario is intended to help authorities 
better anticipate MCM emergency communication dilemmas, 
understand the larger contexts, practice effective responses, and 
develop acuity and agility for addressing unforeseen problems. 
The SPARS Pandemic 2025–2028 features MCM communication 
dilemmas both of the enduring and emerging kind—especially 
those in relation to evolving information and communication 
technologies (ICT).
Benefits of Scenarios and Simulations in Preparing for  
Disasters and Epidemics
The forward-looking SPARS scenario is a tool meant to prompt 
readers to imagine the dynamic and oftentimes conflicted circum-
stances in which MCM emergency communication takes place. By 
engaging readers with a rigorous, simulated health emergency the 
scenario provides opportunities for readers to mentally “rehearse” 
responses while also weighing the implications of their actions 
(Borjeson et al., 2006). Apart from testing out responses to fore-
seeable events, the scenario also provides readers opportunities 
to consider potential measures in today’s environment that might 
avert comparable problems or classes of problems in the future; 
that is, consider how to create a preferred future (Bishop et al., 
2007; Borjeson et al., 2006; Mahmoud et al., 2009; Wilkinson & 
Eidinow, 2008). 
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Producing coherent and imaginative narratives about the 
future to inform decision-making in the present is an approach to 
planning and risk management that businesses, think tanks, gov-
ernments, and non-governmental organizations have embraced 
for a half century or more, and a wide range of aims, applica-
tions, and techniques have evolved (Bishop et al., 2007; Varum 
& Melo, 2010; Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008). In the case of a low- 
probability high-consequence event like a pandemic or CBRN 
incident in which MCM may be deployed, scenario development 
provides a way—absent an actual emergency—for stakeholders to 
characterize specific impacts (based on the accepted science), cre-
ate a shared vision of the threat, weigh alternatives futures with or 
without risk-reducing interventions, and stimulate action (Earth-
quake Engineering Research Institute [EERI], 2019; Preuss & God-
frey, 2006). Earthquake and bioterrorism scenarios, for instance, 
have played important roles in motivating creative thinking about 
the need for novel policies and programs and in mobilizing new 
constituencies around seismic risk reduction (National Research 
Council [NRC], 2011) and public health emergency preparedness 
(Hamilton & Smith, 2006; O’Toole et al., 2002), respectively.
Scenarios that depict an unfolding crisis are valuable tools that 
can heighten awareness about complex hazards and also enable 
practical training for the management of disasters and epidemics 
through exercises (European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control [ECDC], 2014; Federal Emergency Management Agency 
[FEMA], 2019; World Health Organization [WHO], 2018). 
Discussion-based exercises (often called tabletop exercises) help 
participants, typically decision-makers, become more familiar 
with emergency plans and procedures, individual and organiza-
tional roles and responsibilities, and special challenges posed by 
a particular threat to public health and safety. By contrast, opera-
tion-based exercises (such as drills, functional exercises, and field 
exercises) attempt to incorporate, to a lesser or greater degree, the 
front-line personnel, equipment, and physical spaces expected to 
be in play during an actual emergency (FEMA, 2019; Skryabina 
et al., 2017). A majority of studies on the effectiveness of train-
ing in emergency risk communication, in particular, conclude 
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that the impacts of tabletop exercises and simulation for training 
include enhanced awareness, readiness, and knowledge (Miller 
et al., 2017). 
Social Media Challenges/Opportunities for Health and MCM 
Communication
Like the previously mentioned earthquake and bioterrorism sce-
narios, the SPARS scenario is meant to prepare risk and crisis 
communicators for future emergencies, and in particular the com-
plex conditions that rapidly-evolving ICT, including social media, 
are now generating around medicine/public health generally and 
MCM specifically. 
ICT use, including text, illustrations, photo, audio, videos, and 
diagrams communicated through blog posts, instant messages, 
video chats, and social network platforms, is now widespread and 
often used for health-related activities. Among members of the 
public, a 2010 survey by the Pew Research Center, for instance, 
showed that 8 in 10 internet users look online for health infor-
mation, making it the third most popular online activity in the 
U.S. (Fox, 2011). Likewise, practitioners, public health officials, 
and other health experts are increasingly turning to ICT—which 
provides a means to reach the broadest possible population in the 
fastest, easiest, and least expensive manner (Hinton & Hjorth, 
2013)—for a variety of purposes. Clinician-to-patient and peer-
to-peer communication, investing individual patients in their own 
care, information exchanges among diverse healthcare and pub-
lic health stakeholders, and detecting and managing disease out-
breaks have been transformed through ITC (Charles-Smith et al., 
2015; Grajales et al., 2014; Kreps & Neuhauser, 2010; Rice & Sara, 
2018). While this situation may appear overwhelmingly positive, 
some aspects of ITC use and its popularity remain problematic.
First, ITC use has altered the dynamics between health experts 
and the patients and populations they serve (Hawn, 2009). Social 
media in particular has provided a mechanism for laypersons to 
readily share their health-related experiential knowledge with 
each other, thus dislodging the centrality of health professionals’ 
authoritative knowledge in people’s decision-making and behavior 
(Hawn, 2009; Househ et al., 2014).
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Second, ITC can, and is, used to spread false information. 
Wolfe and associates (2002), for example, found that 32% of anti- 
vaccine websites surveyed included pictures of “menacing needles” 
and 23% had pictures of children reported to have been harmed or 
killed by vaccines. As parents come across these images and their 
associated stories this can lead parents to place greater emphasis 
on personal and emotional experience rather than scientific evi-
dence. Referred to as false consensus bias in the social psychology 
literature, parents may then hesitate to vaccinate or reject vaccines 
for their children altogether. 
What is particularly challenging in regard to social media is 
that such images and negative stories tend to have a greater impact 
than facts and positive messages. In their research of vaccination- 
related YouTube videos, for example, Keelan and associates (2007) 
found that while the majority (48%) of the 153 identified vid-
eos promoted vaccination and only 32% were negative toward 
vaccination, the most liked and viewed were the ones with neg-
ative content. The lowest rated and watched videos were pro- 
vaccination public service announcements.
These positive and negative aspects of ITC, in turn, influence 
what practitioners and the broader public understand about MCM 
safety and efficacy, thus presenting new challenges and opportuni-
ties for crisis and risk communicators. Medication users, for exam-
ple, are increasingly sharing personal knowledge and experience 
of drug benefits and risks via online disease support networks, 
patient and drug forums, and microblogging (Matsuda, 2017; 
Sloane et al., 2015). Through social media, these individuals can 
find both practical information and a sense of community, while 
drug safety professionals have a new, rich data source with which 
to mine for potential evidence of adverse events, supplementing 
uneven healthcare provider reports (Edwards & Lindquist, 2011; 
Inch et al., 2012). 
At the same time, great potential exists for the public to 
encounter misleading or dangerous information about pharma-
ceuticals, as non-expert consumers deliver their own drug product 
testimonials and illegal online pharmacies promote their services 
via social media (Tyrawski & DeAndrea, 2015). Misinformation is 
proving especially challenging in connection with vaccines where 
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social media users encounter disproportionate negative reporting 
and images, are more swayed by personal narratives about vacci-
nation’s adverse effects than the science, and tend to judge dispa-
rate ideas about vaccines as equally valid, regardless of expertise 
(Guidry et al., 2015; Kata, 2012; Poland et al., 2009; Witteman & 
Zikmund-Fisher, 2012). Thus, in this current ITC-rich environ-
ment, good communication, and good training for effective com-
munication, is critical.
Methods
To develop the SPARS scenario a project team with expertise in a 
variety of areas, including epidemiology, public health prepared-
ness, risk communication, and the biological and social sciences, 
was assembled. Utilizing these diverse perspectives, the team used 
a combination of the inductive and deductive heuristics delineated 
by Ogilvy and Schwartz (2004) to develop the scenario premise 
(Figure 1). This process began with selecting the timeframe for the 
scenario—the years 2025–2028. These dates, which were 10–13 
years in the future at the time, were chosen to provide a timeline 
that allowed the development of future possibilities, but was not 
so far in the future as to make the scenario become a work of sci-
ence fiction. After the timeframe was established, the project team 
turned to the focal question: What emergency communication 
issues around MCM are most likely to exist 10 years from now?
To begin answering this question, the project team consid-
ered the key economic, environmental, political, social, and tech-
nological factors they felt were likely to emerge by 2025. Factors 
considered by the project team included prominent ones such as 
technological advances like the proliferation of tools to access the 
internet, increased use of the internet for things like social media 
and telemedicine, greater political and social polarizations, chang-
ing demographics in the United States including an aging baby 
boomer population, and climate change and urbanization that 
could result in the (re)emergence of zoonotic diseases. 
After careful discussion of each of these factors, which included 
consideration of existing literature and theoretical approaches, the 
team considered which factors seemed inevitable given present 
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FIGURE 1 The scenario generation process, adapted from Ogilvy and 
Schwartz (2004).
#1 - Identify focal issue and 
time frame
#2 - Brainstorm a list of "key 
drivers"
#3 - Sort "drivers" into 
"predetermined trends" and 
"critical uncertainties"
#4 - Select top 2 "critical 
uncertainties" and build 2x2 
scenario matrix
#5 - Select 1 of the 4 futures 
and elaborate on a complete 
storyline
Deepen the plot through 
systems thinking
Tell a story with a beginning, 
middle, and end
Create characters
Employ standard plot lines
# 6 - Rene the plot through an 
iterative process of reection, 
research, and revision
#7 - Explore the strategic 
implications of the scenario
Single out a key decision or a strategic 
uncertainty that has long-range consequences 
important to the organization
Consider notable forces shaping and 
inuencing the focal issue: social, 
technological, economic, natural, political
Distinguish inevitable trends that will play out 
the same no matter what *versus* important 
trends whose impacts are unsure
Reduce each critical uncertainty to an axis 
with polar cases at each extremity; overlay 
the 2 axes and produce 4 futures to explore
Think of critical events, then delve into under-
lying patterns and structures that these events 
signal; use diagrams to see how forces interact
Capture time and causality dimensions; rst 
this, then that; generate a series of headlines 
describing events over the course of the scenario
Personify the magnitude and direction of 
change by using real or iconic gues
Build on common narratives ("winners and 
losers" and "David and Goliath")
Return to initial focal issue to determine 
gaps, vulnerabilities, options facing the 
organization
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conditions and which were the most likely to impact the direction 
of the scenario. From this process, two critical uncertainties were 
identified: the extent of access to information technology, that the 
team felt was inevitable, and the degree of fragmentation among 
populations along social, political, religious, and cultural lines, 
which the team felt would lead to novel communication issues. The 
project team then used these uncertainties to construct a scenario 
matrix illustrating the four possible futures that could be shaped 
by these trends (Figure 2). After careful consideration, the team 
ultimately chose the “echo-chamber”—a world comprised of iso-
lated and highly fragmented communities with widespread access 
to information technology—as the future in which the prospective 
scenario would take place.
FIGURE 2 Final Scenario Framework: Four possible futures in which the 
SPARS pandemic unfolds.
Unbridled access and openness to information technology (including social 
media)
Isolated 
communities, 
social 
fragmentation
“Echo-chamber” “UN Security 
Council”
Diverse but 
integrated 
communities, 
“melting pot”
“Solitary 
Confinement”
“Shangri-La”
Erratic, unequal access to information technology (including social media)
“Echo-Chamber”—a technologically savvy, plugged in, but fragmented 
society in which groups that hold diverse worldviews consume information 
that continues to validate their own positions, allowing them to live in their 
own mental bubble; government agencies and citizens alike have ready 
access to all the latest informational tools.
“Solitary Confinement”—a society (including general population and public 
sector) with an uneven access to informational technology (due to lack 
of net neutrality, uneven infrastructure) that isolates differently minded 
communities.
“UN Security Council”—a technologically savvy, plugged in society where 
diversity reigns, but difference and tolerance are socially valued, and where 
information flows freely across different groups.
“Singapore”—a melting pot society, with peaceful co-existence of differently 
minded groups, but uneven levels of access to information technology.
80 BRUNSON, CHANDLER, GRONVALL, RAVI, SELL, SHEARER, and SCHOCH-SPANA
From this point, scenario-specific storylines were developed, 
drawing on the subject matter expertise of the project group, 
interviews with expert working group (EWG) members associated 
with the larger project, historical accounts of past MCM crises, 
contemporary media reports, and scholarly literature in sociology, 
emergency preparedness, health education, and risk communica-
tion. This process allowed the project team to identify expected 
and new communication dilemmas to include in the scenario. As 
one example of this, the project team considered how the internet 
and social media affect the social dynamics of health communica-
tion. Using the theory of false consensus bias and the findings on 
vaccination in social media (described previously in the literature 
review section), the project team identified specific communica-
tion dilemmas to include in the scenario. One of these involved 
responding to a particularly emotional video that was widely 
spread via social media and then maintained in the public view for 
months afterward by teenagers who enjoyed the shock value of the 
images. This specific case, titled “Going Viral,” is presented later in 
this paper.
Once different dilemmas were identified, the team considered 
how the different storylines could reasonably fit together and what 
characters were necessary in order for these events to occur. An 
outline for the scenario was then constructed using newspaper 
and other social media headlines as markers for key events; in 
many instances, these remained in the scenario in order to intro-
duce the different dilemmas. Finally, the entire storyline was writ-
ten in draft form as if the SPARS outbreak had occurred in the 
recent past, allowing some outcomes and conclusions to be drawn 
within the scenario.
From this point, scenario development entailed a recursive 
process of continued research and analysis by the project team, 
review and feedback from EWG members (summer 2015), and 
two rounds of external review by authorities on risk communica-
tion and the MCM enterprise (four individuals in fall 2015, three 
individuals in summer 2017). Comprising the project EWG were 
risk and crisis communication scholars; MCM developers, pro-
ducers, and regulators; practitioners in medicine, public health, 
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and pharmacy science; and experienced public health emergency 
managers at all levels of government. Revisions were made after 
each review in order to increase the accuracy and usefulness of the 
material presented in the scenario. 
The final product, referred to hereafter as the SPARS scenario, 
is not intended to be a crystal ball of things to come; rather, it is 
meant to serve as a plausible narrative that illustrates a broad range 
of serious and frequently encountered challenges in the realm of 
risk and crisis communication. To increase the usefulness of the 
scenario, each response- and recovery-phase dilemma is followed 
by food for thought questions that are meant to prompt readers, 
reading as individuals or in training groups, to consider how they 
might respond to similar situations or how they might prevent 
similar problems or classes of problems from occurring in the first 
place. Like the studies of scenario-driven exercises (Skryabina et 
al., 2017) show, including those featuring emergency risk commu-
nication (Miller et al., 2017), the SPARS scenario is intended to 
prepare users for mitigating public health emergencies and man-
aging MCM communication dilemmas more effectively. In the 
following sections, we outline the scenario environment and how 
the fictional outbreak begins. We then provide excerpts of two 
dilemma sections as examples of the larger document. 
The SPARS Scenario: An Introduction
Scenario Environment
The setting of SPARS is the world in 2025–2028. For this time 
period, the project team imagined a world that is simultaneously 
more connected and yet more divided. There is nearly univer-
sal access to wireless internet for even the poorest persons in the 
United States. Additionally, technological innovations and com-
petition between technology companies have made an even wider 
range of information technology readily available to all. Despite 
the possibilities for these advancements to facilitate broad commu-
nication between individuals and communities, the project team 
also envisioned a future where many have chosen to self-restrict 
the sources they seek for information, often electing to interact 
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only with those whom they agree with on significant issues. This 
trend increasingly isolates cliques from one another, making com-
munication across and between these groups more difficult.
In relation to MCM communication more specifically, gov-
ernment agencies like the CDC have increasingly adopted social 
media technologies, including long-existing platforms such as 
Facebook, Snapchat, and Twitter, as well as emerging platforms 
like ZapQ—an interface that enables users to aggregate and 
archive media content from other platforms and communicate 
with cloud-based social groups based on common interests and 
current events. Federal and state public health organizations have 
also developed agency-specific applications and ramped up efforts 
to maintain and update agency websites. 
Challenging this technological grip, however, are the diversity 
of new platforms and the speed with which social media commu-
nities evolve. Moreover, while technologically savvy and capable, 
these agencies still lag in terms of their “multilingual” skills, cul-
tural competence, and ability to be present on all forms of social 
media. These agencies also face budget constraints, which com-
plicates their efforts to improve public communications efficiency 
and effectiveness by increasing their presence in existing and 
emerging social media platforms.
SPARS
After much consideration of possible emergency situations that 
would require MCM use, the project team decided on setting the 
storyline around a novel coronavirus that caused a mild, flu-like 
disease in most instances, but pneumonia and/or hypoxia requir-
ing hospitalization and extensive medical treatment in a small 
minority of cases. The project team named this fictional pathogen 
the St. Paul Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus, or SPARS 
for short, because in the scenario it is first identified in St. Paul, 
Minnesota.
Two features of this disease are important to note because they 
impact how the storyline of the scenario plays out, as well as some 
of the communication dilemmas that occur. First, the project 
team decided to make SPARS have an extended incubation period 
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(7 to 10 days) but a short latent period (4 to 5 days). This compli-
cates the scenario because infected persons in the story are capable 
of spreading the virus for up to 6 days before showing symptoms 
of the disease themselves. This feature of SPARS makes isolation 
procedures in the scenario, like urging people to stay home if 
they think they might be sick, less effective than what is typically 
expected for airborne pathogens and thus introduces novel dilem-
mas in the storyline. Second, the project team decided to make the 
morbidity and mortality from SPARS both significantly higher in 
children than adults, and among pregnant women and those with 
chronic respiratory conditions. This parallels disease characteris-
tics associated with past disease outbreaks, including the H1N1 
pandemic, and allowed for some communication dilemmas from 
the past to be revisited under different future circumstances.
In all, the SPARS scenario provides 19 specific storylines, and 
an associated 23 communication dilemmas for readers to consider. 
An outline of the entire storyline is available in Table 1, and a list 
of the communication dilemmas provided in the scenario can be 
found in Table 2. The following sections provide excerpts of two 
dilemmas included in the scenario as well as their associated com-
munication dilemmas and food for thought questions. 
TABLE 1  Timeline of Events in the “SPARS Pandemic 2025–2028”  
Scenario
2025
October   The first US deaths occurred due to SPARS. Initially, these 
deaths were thought to have been caused by influenza.
November  Cases of SPARS were reported across Minnesota and in six 
other states.
  Thanksgiving holiday travel and Black Friday shopping 
facilitated spread of SPARS beyond the Midwest (26 states 
and multiple other countries by mid-December).
  The WHO declared the SPARS pandemic to be a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern.
December  No treatment or vaccine for SPARS existed, but there was 
some evidence that the antiviral Kalocivir could be effective 
as a therapeutic.
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  A proprietary vaccine developed and manufactured by a 
multinational livestock conglomerate (GMI) was proposed 
as a potential foundation for a human vaccine. The vaccine 
was developed to combat an outbreak of a similar respiratory 
coronavirus in hooved mammal populations in Southeast 
Asia, but the vaccine had not been licensed by any regulatory 
authority or tested in humans. There were concerns over 
potential side effects.
2026
January  The US government contracted CynBio to develop and 
produce a human SPARS vaccine based on the GMI animal 
vaccine.
  The HHS Secretary invoked the Public Readiness and 
Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) to provide liability 
protection for the vaccine manufacturer and providers. 
Congress authorized and appropriated emergency funds 
under the PREP Act to provide compensation for potential 
adverse side effects from the vaccine.
  Following reports of Kalocivir’s limited success in treating 
patients with severe SPARS infections, the FDA issued an 
Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for the antiviral. Kalocivir 
had been evaluated as a therapeutic for SARS and MERS, 
and several million doses were maintained in the SNS, which 
could be deployed as necessary while production capacity 
was established to meet demand.
  The FDA, CDC, and NIH provided seemingly conflicting 
communications regarding the safety and efficacy of 
Kalocivir.
  In the United States, public anxiety around SPARS resulted in 
extensive use of Kalocivir, frequent self-reporting of SPARS 
symptoms, and a surge in demand for medical care.
  By late January SPARS was detected in 42 countries and all US 
states. 
February  A lack of cultural competency in FDA and other 
governmental communication became apparent among 
various ethnic groups in the United States.
  A video of a 3-year-old vomiting and fainting after taking 
a dose of Kalocivir was widely and rapidly spread via social 
media, strengthening opposition to the EUA.
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  The UK Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory 
Agency and the European Medicines Agency jointly 
authorized the emergency use of a new antiviral, VMax, in the 
United Kingdom and throughout the European Union. Some 
Americans attempted to gain access to VMax online or by 
traveling to Europe.
April  The CDC publicized an updated (and significantly lower) case 
fatality rate in the United States; the perception of lesser risk 
triggered a drop in public interest.
May  Production of Corovax, the SPARS vaccine produced by 
CynBio, was well underway.
  Federal agencies initiated a communications campaign using 
well-known public figures with mixed results. Polls indicated 
a 15–23% increase in SPARS and Kalocivir knowledge 
nationwide. Hip-hop icon BZee had success promoting 
public health messaging with an online video clip, but he 
lost credibility when he compared volunteers for Corovax 
trials with “volunteers” from the Tuskegee syphilis study. 
Similarly, former President Bennett provided a non-committal 
response when asked if she would want Kalocivir for her new 
grandson.
  Public health agencies discovered that a relatively new social 
media platform, UNEQL, was being used as a primary means 
of communication in college-aged populations. 
June  Corovax entered the final stage of its expedited review, and 
production capacity was increased. Ten million doses were 
expected to be available by July with fifty million more in 
August.
  The CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice 
(ACIP) announced vaccine priority groups. Healthcare 
providers were not included as a priority, inciting protests by 
doctors and nurses across the country.
  In order to prioritize distribution of limited Corovax supply, 
the federal government requested that states report 
summary information for patient electronic health records 
(EHRs) to estimate the number of individuals in high-risk 
populations. This effort was met with resistance from the 
public, who protested the federal government accessing their 
private medical information.
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July  A week prior to initiating the nationwide vaccination 
program, damage to a power grid in the Pacific Northwest 
resulted in a widespread power outage that lasted two 
weeks. State and local public health agencies initiated 
communications programs using posters and flyers to 
promote the vaccination program in the absence of 
electronic media.
  Social media efforts across the country promoted the 
vaccination campaign, and crowdsourced data helped to 
increase efficiency in distributing the vaccine.
August  The Corovax vaccination program met resistance from several 
groups: alternative medicine proponents, Muslims, African 
Americans, and anti-vaccination activists. Initially operating 
independently, these groups banded together via social 
media to increase their influence.
September  Japan announced that it would not approve Corovax for 
use in Japan in favor of developing and producing its own 
vaccine.
October  College students predominantly on the East and West coasts 
staged protests against the unequal global availability of 
Corovax. Vaccination rates among these students were below 
average for college students in other areas of the country.
November  The anti-anti-vaccine movement, formed in the wake of the 
2015 measles outbreak in the United States, reignited their 
efforts to combat the anti-vaccination super-group. The 
FDA, CDC, and other federal agencies also redoubled their 
communications efforts to promote the Corovax campaign.
  An increasing number of post-SPARS pneumonia cases were 
reported across the country.
December  The nationwide vaccination program was expanded beyond 
the initial priority populations to include the rest of the 
country.
  Federal agencies initiated a vaccination communication 
program involving targeted online advertisements.
2027
February  Post-SPARS pneumonia cases stressed inventories of 
antibiotics across the country. The HHS Secretary authorized 
distribution of the oldest lots of antibiotics from the SNS to 
supplement the antibiotic supply nationwide.
  Tests of antibiotics in the SNS inventory determined that 94% 
of the remaining antibiotics in the oldest lots maintained
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  sufficient potency. Tests conducted in August 2026 provided 
the basis for extending the expiration of these lots from 2027 
to 2029. 
March  Rumors spread via traditional and social media that the 
government was dispensing expired antibiotics.
  Alyssa Karpowitz, a leader in the natural medicine movement, 
sought medical care at an emergency department after 
natural remedies failed to resolve her son’s bacterial 
pneumonia. After successful treatment with proper 
antibiotics from the SNS supply, she touted the benefits of 
“expired” antibiotics in her social media circles.
April  Crowd-sourced and independent epidemiology analysis of 
Corovax side effects conflicted with official federal reports. 
The independent analyses gained popularity in traditional 
and social media due to visual presentation and interactive 
content. Government attempts to respond with data and 
press releases largely failed.
May  Reports of Corovax side effects began to gain traction. Several 
parents of children who experienced neurological symptoms 
after receiving the vaccination sued the federal government 
and CynBio. The lawsuit was dropped when they learned of 
compensation funds available through the PREP Act and the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund.
November  Initial reports of long-term side effects of the Corovax 
vaccine emerged. These reports arose primarily from those 
in the initial priority (high-risk) populations and were few 
in number. With little available data and numerous pre-
existing conditions, initial studies were unable to identify a 
statistically significant association with any long-term effects. 
Claims for compensation were placed on indefinite hold until 
further data could be gathered and analysis completed.
  In response to public demand for long-term side effect 
compensation, the HHS Secretary invited Congress to 
conduct an independent investigation of the federal 
compensation process to alleviate concerns of impropriety.
  The public and media pressured Congress to increase the 
funds authorized for compensation under the PREP Act.
2028
August  The SPARS pandemic was officially declared to be over; 
however, experts remain concerned about domestic animal 
reservoirs and the potential for future outbreaks.
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TABLE 2  Emergency Communication Dilemmas Featured in the “SPARS 
Pandemic 2025–2028” Scenario
Response Phase
 ▶ Engendering public trust and a sense of self-efficacy when a crisis is still 
evolving and critical health information is incomplete
 ▶ Responding to public and political pressure to share information about 
potential MCMs in the development pipeline even though information 
may be incomplete or proprietary
 ▶ Maintaining trust in government processes for ensuring the timely 
development of safe and effective vaccines when novel threats arise
 ▶ Harmonizing inconsistent messaging across health agencies
 ▶ Appropriately tailoring public health messages to address the concerns 
and culture of specific communities 
 ▶ Responding to the power of graphic images of a child in distress: one 
story that is elevated to a population-level problem
 ▶ Responding to demand for an alternative antiviral drug not available in 
the United States
 ▶ Responding to misinformation or doubt about an MCM generated by a 
prominent public figure
 ▶ Overlooking communication platforms used by specific groups; quickly 
gaining fluency and effectively engaging the public using a new media 
platform
 ▶ Responding to public criticism about potential unequal access to MCMs 
like Kalocivir
 ▶ Maintaining public support after changing positions on MCM safety and 
efficacy 
 ▶ Communicating the need for and reasoning behind the prioritization of 
scarce resources
 ▶ Publicizing MCM programs and availability to promote uptake and 
efficient distribution
 ▶ Providing real-time data on vaccine availability to align MCM supply with 
public demand 
 ▶ Maintaining consistent messaging across electronic and non-electronic 
media and implementing a secondary communications plan if electronic 
media are not available
 ▶ Addressing multiple independent MCM concerns simultaneously
 ▶ Meeting the information needs of citizens who come from diverse 
cultural, social, and demographic backgrounds and who may have 
varying degrees of trust in health authorities
 ▶ Supporting the current MCM product in the face of opposition from a 
foreign regulatory agency
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 ▶ Responding to complex ethical issues that are beyond the United States 
government’s control
 ▶ Responding to questions regarding safety and efficacy of drugs that have 
extended shelf lives
Recovery Phase
 ▶ Communicating with the public about trustworthy sources of data and 
options for legal recourse in a climate of mistrust
 ▶ Bringing a sense of resolution to a period of crisis while striking a balance 
between the need to affirm collective grief/loss and the need to move 
forward
 ▶ Institutionalizing communications lessons from the 2025–2028 SPARS 
pandemic
Response Scenario Excerpt 
The following excerpt from the scenario takes place early on 
in the pandemic. One month previously the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) had issued an Emergency Use Authorization 
(EUA) for the antiviral Kalocivir. The drug had been evaluated as 
a therapeutic for other coronavirus-caused diseases and several 
million doses were maintained by the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS), which meant the drug could be deployed as necessary while 
production capacity was established to meet demand. The FDA 
and CDC provided information on the drug, but some differ-
ences in their messaging caused concern among certain groups 
including parents of young children. The specific communication 
dilemma this excerpt considers is how to confront the power of a 
single graphic image of a child in distress when one story is ele-
vated to a population-level problem. 
“Going Viral”
Reports of negative side effects associated with Kalocivir began 
gaining traction in February 2026. Despite the negative response, 
public health agencies continued to make forward progress until 
February 22, when a video of a 3-year-old boy in North Carolina 
projectile vomiting immediately after taking a dose of Kalocivir 
went viral. In the video clip, the boy swallows a pediatric dose of 
liquid Kalocivir, vomits profusely, chokes, and then faints in the 
pool of his own vomit while his mother shrieks in the background. 
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This clip was widely shared across the United States with a 
variety of captions including #AntiviralsDontWork, #DontTake 
TheDrugs, and #NaturalCuresAreBetterThanThis. The hashtags, 
in turn, provided a way for people sharing these views to find one 
another and band together on social media. They formed ZapQ 
and other online discussion groups, which allowed them to receive 
any messages from group members via smartphones and internet 
accessing technology (IAT) instantaneously as they were posted. 
Some members of these ZapQ groups even began to use full-sized 
(12"×12") IAT screens on the backs of their jackets, coats, and 
backpacks to loop the vomiting video for all in their immediate 
vicinity to see.
The social media groundswell quickly overwhelmed the capac-
ity of local, state, and federal agencies to respond, and compliance 
with public health and medical recommendations dropped consid-
erably. The FDA and other government agencies quickly attempted 
to remind the public that correlation does not equate to causation, 
and that vomiting was not a known side effect of Kalocivir. This 
message, while scientifically accurate, lacked appropriate empathy 
and failed to assuage the public’s mounting fears. As a result, it was 
largely ignored, and public concern continued to grow.
In the following weeks, officials from the FDA, CDC, and 
other government organizations attempted to promote positive, 
accurate information about Kalocivir on several traditional and 
social media platforms in order to quell public fear. This messag-
ing, however, was less than optimal both in terms of timing and 
dissemination. While the government took several days to provide 
an emotionally appropriate message, the spread of the viral video 
on social media was exponentially faster. By the time the govern-
ment responded, most people across the country had already seen 
the vomiting video and formed their own conclusions. Addition-
ally, in their responses, governmental organizations were not able 
to effectively access all social media platforms. ZapQ groups, for 
example, had closed memberships and typically could only be 
accessed via invitations from group members. 
Both of these issues prompted government organizations to 
improve the timing and impact of their social media responses. 
While most government agencies, including the CDC and HHS, 
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had long-established offices that were directed to coordinate social 
media and other communication efforts, the protocols of indi-
vidual agencies and different agency cultures led to delayed and 
sometimes uncoordinated messages.
Despite the many outreach efforts by various government 
officials and entities, the government was ultimately unable to 
develop a suitable replacement for the initial vomiting video. By 
early June 2026, the video had become the most shared Zap clip 
among junior high and high school students across the country 
who appreciated the shock factor of the video. As a result, the pub-
lic was continually re-exposed to the anti-Kalocivir message for 
several months after the initial incident and subsequent responses.
Food for Thought Questions:
1. Why might communicating the science around MCM adverse 
effects alone not be enough to address people’s fears and con-
cerns about an MCM like Kalocivir? Why is it also important 
to communicate with compassion, concern, and empathy?
2. To what extent is having sufficiently skilled staff and organi-
zational capacity to communicate via traditional media and 
social media platforms critical to influencing public debates 
and awareness about an MCM like Kalocivir?
3. What MCM communication challenges are likely to emerge 
among up-and-coming youth audiences who are avid consum-
ers of interactive and visual forms of information?
Recovery Scenario Excerpt
The following excerpt from the scenario considers issues related 
with recovery, and how to communicate with the public about 
trustworthy sources of data and options for legal recourse in a cli-
mate of mistrust. At this point in the storyline, Corovax, the FDA-
approved vaccine for SPARS, has been released for more than 
9 months and the United States is solidly in the recovery phase 
of the pandemic. SPARS is now uncommon in the US and public 
focus has shifted from the disease to the potential side effects of 
SPARS treatments including the Corovax vaccine.
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“Vaccine Injury”
As time passed and more people across the United States were 
vaccinated, claims of adverse side effects began to emerge. Several 
parents claimed that their children were experiencing neurolog-
ical symptoms similar to those seen among livestock exposed to 
the GMI vaccine. By May 2027, parental anxiety around this claim 
had intensified to the point of lawsuits. That month, a group of 
parents whose children developed mental retardation as a result of 
encephalitis in the wake of Corovax vaccination sued the federal 
government, demanding removal of the liability shield protecting 
the pharmaceutical companies responsible for developing and 
manufacturing Corovax. 
The growing plaintiff cohort quickly withdrew their suit upon 
learning that the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust 
Fund (NVICTF) and an emergency appropriation of funds autho-
rized by Congress under the PREP Act existed to provide financial 
reimbursement to those who were adversely affected by the Cor-
ovax vaccine in order to cover healthcare costs and other related 
expenses. Given the positive reaction to the federal government’s 
response and the fact that the majority of US citizens willing to 
be vaccinated had already been immunized, the negative publicity 
surrounding adverse reactions had little effect on nationwide vac-
cination rates. The focus on adverse side effects, however, resulted 
in a considerable increase in the number of compensation claims 
filed, and many grew concerned about the long-term effects that 
Corovax could have on their health. This concern was particularly 
high among some African American parents who continued to 
question the government’s motives regarding the Corovax vacci-
nation campaign.
While the FDA, CDC, and other agencies were busy research-
ing possible connections between Corovax and the reported neu-
rological side effects, their efforts were continually undermined by 
epidemiological analyses produced by various non-governmental 
individuals and groups. The popular science blogger EpiGirl, for 
example, began posting interactive maps of the incidence of Cor-
ovax side effects in April 2027. To create the maps, EpiGirl col-
lected anecdotes of adverse Corovax side effects using Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube and combined them with data downloaded 
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from the HHS Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), 
a national vaccine safety surveillance program maintained by the 
CDC and FDA. EpiGirl also encouraged those among her sub-
scribers who were Apple product users to share health data with 
her via Apple’s ResearchKit and HealthKit applications. EpiGirl’s 
maps were consequently shared widely in social media circles and 
even included in local and national news reports.
The federal government became concerned about the validity 
of EpiGirl’s anecdotal data and the widespread sharing of patient 
information via the internet. EpiGirl’s data showed a significantly 
higher incidence rate of nearly every reported side effect; how-
ever, federal officials believed that this was largely due to dupli-
cate entries resulting from compiling data from multiple sources. 
Additionally, EpiGirl’s data did not seek to address the cause of the 
reported side effects, only the incidence rate. Publication of sim-
ilar results from organizations such as Patients-Like-Me, a group 
closely associated with the natural medicine movement, further 
legitimized these independent reports. The government attempted 
to respond to these claims through formal press releases, but these 
were neither as visually appealing nor as interactive as EpiGirl’s 
maps and were, therefore, largely ignored.
Food for Thought Questions:
1. How might advance development and testing of recovery mes-
sages that specifically address the topics of adverse side effects 
and the NVICTF help improve health authorities’ ability to 
respond to public distress about medical issues emerging after 
an MCM campaign? What are some messages that would war-
rant such testing?
2. Despite the uncertain science about the link between Coravax 
and the reported neurological symptoms, why should health 
officials still communicate with compassion and genuine sym-
pathy toward those in the vaccinated population who experi-
ence medical issues subsequent to being vaccinated? 
3. Given growing interest in open data systems and the appli-
cation of “crowd sourcing” to solve complex problems, how 
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might public health officials take greater advantage of two-way 
communication with an interested public in the aftermath of 
the SPARS outbreak? For instance, how might input and anal-
ysis from members of the public help improve adverse event 
monitoring or assess the strengths and weaknesses of a specific 
MCM campaign? 
Crafting Scenarios: Lessons Learned
Creating the scenario described above was a months-long process 
that involved many iterative steps. While the basic process of sce-
nario development is both described above and detailed by others 
including Ogilvy and Schwartz (2004), the following are offered as 
lessons learned in order to assist in the development and design of 
scenarios in the future:
 ▶ Having a project team with different academic backgrounds 
(i.e., medicine, public health, and the social sciences) provided 
a solid foundation for developing the premise of the future in 
which the scenario would take place. Different perspectives, 
disagreements, and even lively debates were essential to devel-
oping a premise that was both realistic and meaningful. This 
process also provided forward momentum for the develop-
ment of specific storylines.
 ▶ Storyboarding the timeline of events was important to main-
taining coherency in the project. In the development of the 
SPARS scenario, storyboarding was not a one-time process but 
rather an ongoing exercise that occurred throughout scenario 
development.
 ▶ As storyboarding was occurring, it was essential to keep in 
mind the audiences for the project. In several cases, lessons 
specific audiences needed to walk away with were the starting 
point; the project team used these to work backward to make 
sure those lessons were fully incorporated into the storyline.
 ▶ A focus on small details, including using supporting illustra-
tions like newspaper and social media headlines, was neces-
sary to make the scenario as realistic as possible. This process 
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of “sweating the small stuff ” also provided a mechanism for 
the project team to check and recheck the accuracy of the over-
all product.
 ▶ Vetting the scenario with a group of subject matter experts 
was critical. In the SPARS scenario, this process helped iden-
tify dilemmas that were of particular relevance to specific 
target audiences as well as detect plot holes and inaccuracies 
that were necessary to fix in order for the storyline to be both 
believable and useful.
 ▶ Finally, developing facilitator guides along with the scenario 
was a way to increase the facility of the scenario as a teaching 
tool.
Conclusion
Effective communication about medical countermeasures—
including drugs, devices, and biologics (e.g., vaccines)—is often 
critical in emergency situations. Such communication, how-
ever, does not just happen. It must be planned and prepared for. 
Prospective scenarios, like the SPARS scenario described in this 
paper, offer important opportunities for communication planning 
and preparation by enabling readers, both individually and in 
discussion with others, to rehearse responses to communication 
dilemmas; encouraging readers to envision what the next gener-
ation of best practices in MCM emergency communication may 
entail, given technological and social trends such as the growing 
influence of social media and increasing levels of social isolation; 
and prompting readers to consider and prepare for other future 
communication dilemma possibilities. In today’s world of rapidly- 
evolving ICT, such preparation is especially crucial. 
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